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 Building the external corporate venturing capability: Initial
conditions, learning processes and knowledge management
ABSTRACT
How firms build new capabilities to adapt to changing environments is in the core of
strategic management. However, only recently research has addressed this question. In this
paper I develop a model that lays out how firms develop an capability to create and develop
ventures through corporate venture capital, alliances, and acquisitions. The model is based on
seven in-depth case studies of large corporations operating in the information and communi-
cation technology sector in Europe and the USA.
In the core of this model are the learning processes that enable the firm to build up an ex-
ternal corporate venturing capability, both within and outside venturing relationships. I dis-
cuss the role of initial conditions and knowledge management practice on the direction and
effectiveness of the learning processes leading to an external corporate venturing capability.
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Through what processes do firms develop new competencies? What factors govern proc-
esses of competence development?
The development of capabilities has been recognized as one potential source of economic
rents for the firm (Makadok, 2001). Most early research within the resource-based view of
strategic management, however, has focused on identifying specific resources and
capabilities that yield competitive advantage for the firm. In the normative version of this re-
search, firms have been prescribed to concentrate on resources and capabilities that are rare,
inimitable, valuable, and not substitutable (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993, Barney, 1991,
Barney, 1995).
Implicit assumption of research in static view has been the pre-existence of resources.
Hence, relatively little effort has been invested onto understanding how, over time, firms de-
velop these resources and how they become successful in using them (Helfat, 2000).
One attempt to address this question has been the dynamic capability view of strategic
management. Authors in this line of research argue that the ability to adapt capabilities and
build new capabilities is not only an important success factor (Grant, 1996, Teece, et al.,
1997), but it may be considered a capability in itself. Teece et al. (1997) capture this idea
with the notion of a dynamic capability. They define the dynamic capability of the firm as
“the firm’s ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competences to
address rapidly changing environments” (Teece, et al., 1997: 516).   
The concept of dynamic capability has been criticized as being tautological and vague
(Williamson, 1999). To counter this critique Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) argue that dy-
namic capability should be understood to be reflected in tangible processes of the firm.
Clearly definable processes, such as product development, or alliancing, form the building
blocks that enable the firm to develop new capabilities and reconfigure existing ones. For in-
stance, the dynamic capabilities can consist of resource integration processes (Iansiti andBuilding external corporate venturing capability
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Clark, 1994) or resource acquisition processes (Karim and Mitchell, 2000). Other dynamic
capabilities might include resource reconfiguration through knowledge transfer, resource al-
location, or charter changes (Burgelman, 1994, Galunic and Eisenhardt, 1996, Kogut and
Zander, 1992). While being a first step towards a theory of capability development. Most
writings in the dynmic capability view, do not investigate the managerial processes leading to
capability building in great detail (Cockburn, et al., 2000) but that analytical and empirical
understanding of these processes is necessary to entangle the sources of competitive advan-
tages.
A second stream of literature is more concerned with the processes leading to capability
development and factors influencing these processes. Work in the context of evolutionary
economics argues that the evolution of competencies takes place in a path-dependent and
cumulative fashion within the firm (Nelson and Winter, 1982, Winter, 1990). Existing re-
sources and capabilities constrain the firm’s future behavior as search for new solutions takes
place close to existing solutions that are codified in existing capabilities. In the light of envi-
ronment change these local search processes can inhibit effective adaptation of the firm.
Leonard-Barton (1992) argues that existing core capabilities can become core rigidities by
guiding resources and efforts into domains that might no longer provide value for the firm.
Rosenbloom (2000) provides an example with NCR’s entry into the computer industry.
NCR’s persistence in practices that had been previously part of its core competence led to a
crisis, which was only, resolved when new management initiated a fundamental organiza-
tional transformation.
Recent work in strategic management further underlines the role of initial conditions for
the development of dynamic capability. In a study of four entrants into the early semicon-
ductor industry, Holbrook, Cohen, Hounshell, & Klepper (2000) show that firms’ origins and
particularly their founders experience have lasting effects on the firm’s ability to integrateBuilding external corporate venturing capability
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research and development and manufacturing. Similarly, Raff (2000) found that initial vi-
sions of founders shape the evolution of capability. Based on a study of the evolution of two
U.S. book superstore chains, he documented how the capability of the firms evolved from
these early visions through a process of local search and adaptation.
In addition to initial conditions, also cognitive factors matter for the development of dy-
namic capability. Literature on strategic inertia maintains that cognitive frameworks can
constitute a part of existing capabilities, and that they often shape or limit the evolution of
new capabilities (Barr, et al., 1992, Bogner and Barr, 2000). Tripsas and Gavetti (2000) illus-
trate how the cognitive frameworks of managers in Polaroid effectively precluded the com-
pany from taking advantage of its technological knowledge in the digital imaging market.
Several authors (Lei, et al., 1996, Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000, Westney, 1988) have sug-
gested that organizational learning processes lead to the formation of capabilities. Organiza-
tional learning is often understood as the process through which an organization acquires new
knowledge, processes and maintains it, and uses or exploits it (Huber, 1991). While organ-
izational learning is necessary for capability development, it should not be equated with it, as
a large number of organizational learning modes and forms exist (Huber, 1991) that are not
all equally linked to capability development. Argyris and Schön (1978) distinguish between
single-loop-learning, double-loop-learning. Single-loop-learning is viewed as a reactive ad-
aptation to the environment. Goals, norms, and knowledge structures remain unchanged. In
contrast, double-loop-learning is a more reflective process. It encompasses the modification
of goals, norms, and knowledge structures and can be prompted both as a reaction to
environmental change and as a proactive search process. Lei et al. (1996) argue that only
double-loop learning processes enable the firm to build competencies.
In addition to distinguishing between single-loop and double loop learning, a distinction
between specific learning mechanisms is important. Huber (1991) identifies five organiza-Building external corporate venturing capability
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tional learning processes. Congenital learning describes the learning process before the
founding of the organization, whereby the knowledge of the organization is brought in when
the organization is formed. Experiential learning includes both experiments and learning that
may be unplanned or even unintended. Other authors refer to this form of learning as learn-
ing-by-doing (Levitt and March, 1988). Vicarious learning describes learning from other or-
ganizations. The learning can be through imitation but also through espionage. Grafting de-
scribes learning through new employees and includes hiring new employees or acquiring
whole new organizations. Finally, searching and noticing describes the process by which or-
ganizations systematically scan the environment for information that they use to create new
knowledge.
Several factors have been discussed that affect how effectively a firm can utilize the
learning processes described above. For instance, Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) argue that
particularly repeated practice (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999), knowledge codification
(Singh and Zollo, 1998), and learning through small mistakes (Sitkin, 1992) are important.
While the above studies make some progress towards a more fine-grained view of capa-
bility building, particularly theories of organizational learning processes and capability
building would need to be further integrated. In this paper I aim to contribute to this integra-
tion. In the context of corporate venturing activities of large firms in the information and
communication technology sector, I analyze how firms develop the capability to creatae and
develop new ventures. In particular, the study focuses how large firms learn how to create
and develop ventures together with external partners through venture capital investments, al-
liances, and acquisitions, an activity that is referred to here as external corporate venturing.
Based on seven in-depth case studies, I develop a model that explains how firms develop
an external corporate venturing capability. In the core of this model are two learning proc-
esses. I argue that firms need to learn outside of venturing relationships to achieve sufficientBuilding external corporate venturing capability
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bredth and speed of learning. The second learning process that tkes place within or alongside
of venturing relationships provides depth to the knowledge generated and helps institutional-
izing it into a capability. I further argue that initial conditions and knowledge management
practice play an important role in affecting both the direction and the effectiveness of the
learning processes leading to an external venturing capability.
METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH SETTING
The study this paper is based on was conducted as a qualitative, multiple case study de-
sign. This method would seem appropriate as the study is concerned with the processes of
competence building. These complex processes unfold over several years. The case method is
ideal to capture the richness and complexity of this phenomenon (Yin, 1994). In addition, my
study is concerned with theory building rather than theory testing. Case studies ideally lend
themselves to grounding theory development in actual case data (Eisenhardt, 1989, Glaser
and Strauss, 1967).
The empirical focus of this paper is on external corporate venturing activities of large
firms in the information and communication technology (ICT) sector. Corporate venturing
activity ideally lends itself to the study of competence development processes because, par-
ticularly in the information and communication technology sector, a large number of corpo-
rations have only recently started this activity. While corporate venturing activity as such is
not new but rather a cyclical phenomenon, many of the firms engaging in the current wave of
corporate venturing have little experience in systematic venturing.
In the study reported in this paper, I studied seven venturing program of large interna-
tional corporations operating in several segments of the information and communication
technology sector. It was essential to cover several segments of the information and commu-
nication technology sector, because differences exist in the business models of equipmentBuilding external corporate venturing capability
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manufacturers and of service providers, for example. Cases were chosen from companies
headquartered in Europe and the United States of America, with the majority of the case
companies being European. I chose cases to cover different organizational modes to conduct
corporate venturing. While some case companies have organized venturing in a dedicated or-
ganization or division, others conduct these activities alongside other business development
activities. A final case selection criterion was maturity of the venturing activity. In all seven
cases, venturing activities had been conducted for several years so that sufficient time had
passed for learning and capability building to take place.
For reasons of confidentiality, the names of the participating firms cannot be disclosed
here, and the name, location, and some key figures of the firms are disguised in the case de-
scriptions and analyses below. A brief discussion of the case companies follows. Instead of
their real names, the case firms will be referred to with the names GIANT, SPEED,
RECEIVER, ROLLER, ROCK, INVENTOR, and FLYER.
GIANT is a telecom operating company with a strong home market presence. Only re-
cently the company has started an international expansion program which involves several
new ventures. Several of these ventures have been recognized as pioneering in their domain.
GIANT currently employs over 10 000 employees. In 2000
1, sales exceeded EUR 2 billion.
Corporate venturing activity in GIAN is organized within a dedicated venturing business unit.
SPEED focusses on telecommunications equipment and terminals. The company is al-
ready recognized as one of the leading companies in its industry. With well over 70 000 em-
ployees, SPEED’s revenues in 2000 exceeded EUR 28 billion. Similar to GIANT, SPEED
has set up a dedicated venturing unit.
                                                
1  For comparability, 2000 sales and employment data have been used.Building external corporate venturing capability
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RECEIVER is a telecom operator providing services to both corporate and private cus-
tomers. Like many telecom operators traditionally home market focused, RECEIVER has
made major attempts to internationalize. In 2000, RECEIVER employed well over 100 000
people and generated sales that exceeded EUR 45 billion. Due to its size RECEIVER has or-
ganized corporate venturing activities at the corporate and the divisional level. Aside from
several central venturing departments, the different business units have created their own
venturing departments.
ROLLER is a telecom operator. Based on a long tradition and strong financials, ROLLER
has pursued an aggressive expansion strategy. At the end of 2000, ROLLER employed 20
000 employees and had generated sales of EUR 12 billion. Within ROLLER, venturing ac-
tivity is conducted as an interplay of divisional business development and corporate business
development.
ROCK is an information and telecommunications equipment and terminal manufacturer.
It is one of the larges players in the information and communication technology sector. In
2000, ROCK employed well over 100 000 employees and generated over EUR 26 billion
sales. Venturing activities are organized at the corporate and the divisional level.
INVENTOR is a major supplier to the information and communication technology sector.
Its focus is on components and subsystems that play an important role in the products of most
telecommunications equipment companies. Employing over 35 000 people, in 2000,
INVENTOR generated sales of about EUR 14 billion. In INVENTOR, venturing activities
are decentralized. Most ventures are located in the business units but coordinated by a central
department. Ventures are often consolidated by forming special business units.
FLYER is producing both information technology equipment and telecommunications
equipment. In 2000, with sales in excess of EUR 50 billion, FLYER employed well over 85Building external corporate venturing capability
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000 people. Similar to INVENTOR, FLYER has decentralized its venturing activities. How-
ever, a central support staff exists that develops processes and supports external corporate
venturing relationships.
Research Process
I collected empirical data during the period of 1996 to 2000. In the cases GIANT and
SPEED, I followed the case companies over the whole period and collected data at several
points in time. In the other five case companies data collection took place from 1999 to 2000.
With this design I combine the strength of real time longitudinal research that is naturally
limited in the number of cases that can be studied, with the strength of multiple retrospective
replication cases that strengthen the basis for generalization (Leonard-Barton, 1990).
In each of the case companies, I conducted  multiple semi-structured interviews several
executives. In the two lead cases I interviewed altogether forty-nine managers. In the five
other cases, I interviewed from four to six managers per case.  Managers were all directly in-
volved in corporate venturing activities but represented different functions and organizational
level to reduce the potential for ex-post rationalization bias due to group pressure on a par-
ticular managerial level or function.  The average interview lasted about one hour with some
interviews lasting as long as three hours. During the interviews I used a semi-structured in-
terview guide with sixteen open-ended questions. As typical in inductive research, I followed
up with additional questions to explore emerging issues in more detail. All but two interviews
in which the interviewee reject the practice were taped to be able to concentrate on the inter-
view process rather then trying to transcribe the interview on the spot.
In addition to the interview data I collected additional primary and secondary data by
consulting annual reports, reports to financial analysts, world wide web documents, and press
                                                
2  For comparability, 2000 sales and employment data have been used.Building external corporate venturing capability
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releases, minutes of meetings, process documentation, but also industry reports, trade jour-
nals, and news services. Purpose of this additional data collection was to to increase the reli-
ability and validity of data through triangulation (Huberman and Miles, 1994).
Data analysis was drawing on the established procedures suggested in the literature
(Eisenhardt, 1989, Miles and Huberman, 1994, Strauss and Corbin, 1998, Yin, 1994). First, I
developed a brief description of each case. This overview was then turned into a full descrip-
tion of the whole case (Yin, 1994). At the same time, I coded the transcripts starting with an
initial list of codes was developed based on the pre-understanding of the research domain.
During the coding process I added new codes that emerged from the data. Finally, the result-
ing list of codes was condensed and codes were merged that were conceptually identical.
Based on the coded data, I analyzed concept and their underlying structure first within the
lead cases and then across cases using matrices, networks, and other forms of data display.
This analysis follows two important principles. First, concept relationships that were not pre-
sent in all cases were dropped during the analysis. For this purpose, I tabulated evidence
across cases and searched systematically for evidence contradicting emerging propositions
(Eisenhardt, 1991). Second literature was consulted to extend and refine the findings from the
cases. The analysis, thus, rotated between empirical data, emergent theory and related litera-
ture. Through this process of iterating between data, theory and literature, validity and reli-
ability concerns were addressed during the analysis.
DEVELOPMENT OF EXTERNAL CORPORATE VENTURING CAPABILITIES
External corporate venturing refers to new businesses creation activity of established or-
ganizations in which the corporation leverages external partners in the process of creating a
venture or developing an internal venture. Corporations can utilize several organizational
modes to conduct external corporate venturing. Organizational modes include corporateBuilding external corporate venturing capability
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venture capital investments, alliances, and acquisitions. External corporate venturing can
support the development of new capabilities and the adaptation and recombination of existing
capabilities. However, not all firms can utilize these mechanisms to the same extent. Rather,
data collected for this study suggest that firms differ in their ability to manage external corpo-
rate ventures and in their ability to utilize these for capability building and reconfiguration. I
propose the notion of an external corporate venturing capability that can be defined as the
firm’s ability to utilize external ventures to develop new capabilities and reconfigure existing
capabilities in the process of building new business areas outside of the current business fo-
cus of the corporation. External venturing capability is thought of as a higher order capability
residing on the organizational level. It is reflected in lower order component competencies
such as alliance management or corporate venture capital competencies.
If firms differ in their external corporate venturing capability the question arises where do
these differences come from and how have firms with superior external corporate venturing
capabilities built these capabilities? Figure 1 depicts a simple model of the development of
external corporate venturing capability that emerged from the interplay of empirical data and
related literature.
We view external corporate venturing capability as the outcome of a learning process.
Part of this learning takes place within external corporate venturing relationships in the form
of learning-by-doing (Levitt and March, 1988) or experiential learning (Huber, 1991). How-
ever, the organization learns also outside external corporate venturing relationships, for in-
stance through the new employees or consultants. The learning processes are influenced by at
least two groups of factors. The learning processes are affected by knowledge management
practices. Depending on such practices, learning may be more or less effective. The learning
processes are further constrained by initial conditions, such as the organizational structure, orBuilding external corporate venturing capability
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the venturing background of the organization. Initial conditions not only affect learning proc-
esses, but also have a direct effect on the external corporate venturing capability.
**********************************
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
**********************************
Learning processes. We view corporate venturing as a learning process in which the firm
learns to operate in a new business domain and builds new capabilities or reconfigures exist-
ing capabilities to do so. This learning process can be termed as content learning. Knowledge
and capabilities built through content learning are specific to the venture. While developing
new ventures, the organization also learns the process of venturing. This learning might be
termed process learning. Process learning can be viewed as a second-order or double-loop
learning process that take place in parallel to the processes of building knowledge and capa-
bility in the venture domain. For instance, the corporation might build or reconfigure capa-
bilities of how to operate in a specific market, or how to operate specific business models, or
technologies. In parallel to this first order learning process, the organization forms the capa-
bility to venture and ultimately to develop these capabilities. In other words, the firm learns
to learn. Naturally, the two learning processes interact and in practice cannot be separated.
The strongest form of interaction takes place if the organization learns directly from the
external ventures through learning-by-doing. In the learning-by-doing process, organizations
learn by conducting activities repeatedly and adapting to past experience (Cyert and March,
1963, March and Simon, 1958). Organizational action produces outcome responses from the
environment that must be interpreted by the organization. Based on the evaluation of the re-
sponse, organizations adapt their course of action to increase the probability of securing the
desired response (Van de Ven and Polley, 1992). In this process, organizations make mis-
takes, but by recognizing such mistakes, they are able to adjust decision rules and develop
routines that have already passed environment selection (Glynn, et al., 1994, Winter, 1990).Building external corporate venturing capability
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Interviewees stress that through real cases, deep knowledge is built. Part of such learning is
firm specific and cannot be transferred from an outside partner. Table 4 summarizes evidence
regarding learning-by-doing processes in the case companies.
**********************************
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
**********************************
SPEED provides a good example for the learning-by-doing process. While early acquisi-
tions have been managed without a prescribed process, SPEED has been developing proc-
esses to acquire start-ups and maintain their innovativeness. One manager summarizes this
process:
I would say that during the few acquisitions we have done, we have learned quite
a bit. The first ones were not as successful as the ones that were done lately. I would
say that they were done differently... So, we started with very ad hoc methods. It was
learning process. Now we have learned to say that the integration phase is very cru-
cial. We need to dedicate resources, we need to have human resources there, we
need to have the integration managed, we need to have the business owner, the tech-
nology owner, HR, legal, IM, all that.
The above quote provides an example how experience is explicitly captured in the form
of process descriptions. Similarly, other case companies developed policies such as majority
requirements for joint ventures, based on the experience from external corporate ventures.  In
other cases, the experience guides more implicitly if, for instance, the same personnel is in-
volved in future cases.
Several challenges arise within learning-by-doing processes. First, knowledge from cases
is not easily generalized. For instance, Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) find that in acquisi-Building external corporate venturing capability
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tion cases, managers erroneously generalize experiences to dissimilar cases. In addition,
learning as a by-product may also lead to a cycle in which existing knowledge in one domain
may lead managers to further strengthen activities in that domain at the expense of less well
known domains (Levinthal and March, 1993).
Aside from capturing experience of ventures, the organization can use a variety of addi-
tional learning mechanisms in which it learns from sources outside of existing external corpo-
rate ventures. Following Huber’s (1991) classification of learning processes, these include
congenital learning, vicarious learning, grafting, and searching and noticing. Table 5 summa-
rizes evidence of these learning processes.
**********************************
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
**********************************
Particularly for corporate venture capital activities, the interviewees point out that they
have embarked on such activities through experimentation. Imitation of other organizations,
learning from partners, and transferring personnel play important roles. One might argue that
the recent proliferation of corporate venture capital funds is largely due to interorganizational
imitation. Imitation plays an important role at a more detailed level. Some of the case compa-
nies chose to build their corporate venture capital function by imitating the behavior of tradi-
tional venture capitalists. To be able to imitate and learn the behavior of traditional venture
capitalists, such firms partner with venture capital firms often acting as the sole limited part-
ner in a dedicated venture fund. A corporate venture capital manager from GIANT summa-
rizes the logic of such partnerships:Building external corporate venturing capability
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We have our own representatives working in the VC fund. For both persons who
were sent there, the idea was that each is part of the organizational learning. These
people with their technological background would start working in a venture capital
firm through providing assistance in the due diligence process on the technological
side. But also learning the idea of business development and VC.
For instance, GIANT has entered into relationships with two venture capital firms and
negotiated relationships that allow it to send personnel to work on site with the venture capi-
tal firm. The employees transfer knowledge and practices back to GIANT. The knowledge
has been used to manage direct investments that GIANT has undertaken.
Aside from imitation and learning from partners, the corporations have used hiring of ex-
perienced personnel as an additional means of gaining access to knowledge of external corpo-
rate venturing. In RECEIVER, for instance, corporate venture capital operations have been
started by a seasoned venture capital manager that has been hired to build up an corporate
venture capital organization. Such new employees can help to transfer knowledge faster than
a newcomer learning the knowledge from an outside source. Similarly, internal personnel
transfer is an important knowledge transfer channel. Several interviewees report the transfer
of employees that have related knowledge and experience such as mergers and acquisitions
knowledge.
Transferring personnel and hiring personnel from outside supports the bridging between
the corporation and the start-up community. While new hires from the venture capital or
start-up community can support building a shared context with such firms, long term employ-
ees help to build the strong links to different units in the corporation that are essential to
transferring knowledge and affect their decision making.
Learning outside of external corporate venturing relationships also includes conceptual
work such as developing policies or processes for external corporate venturing. External in-Building external corporate venturing capability
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formation sources can play an important role. Certain of the corporations use consultants as a
source of information and knowledge. Others use undergraduate and graduate student proj-
ects as a way of gaining access to academic knowledge.
We view learning-by-doing and learning outside of external ventures as complementary
rather than competing mechanisms. While learning outside of ventures can shorten the
learning period, it cannot institutionalize an organizational capability. Knowledge, structures,
and processes that may be transferred through this process are not adapted to the new organi-
zation. Learning and capability development is in all circumstances context dependent that is
what is learned needs to be connected to the organization. Deepening the knowledge, institu-
tionalizing and adopting to the specific organizational context is best achieved through
learning-by-doing.
GIANT provides an example how these mechanisms complement each other. GIANT has
started venturing activities in its present form by consolidating fragmented activities that had
been conducted in several business units. GIANT has been building on its previous experi-
ence. However, at the same time, a large-scale consulting project and several experts hired
from outside have provided GIANT with knowledge before entering cases. Following this
start, GIANT has continued to capture learning from cases by process development and has
also continued to utilize consultants and hire employees from expert organizations. This ex-
ample demonstrates that in practice, both learning processes play an important role.
Initial conditions and knowledge management practices. Table 5 summarizes evidence
regarding the role of initial conditions in the development of an external corporate venturing
capability. The evidence suggests that firms differ in their starting point and that such differ-
ences persist over time. In line with literature (Almeida and Kogut, 1997, Autio, et al., 2000,
Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998, Stuart and Podolny, 1996), initial conditions such as existing
component capabilities can direct the learning path an organization takes. For external corpo-Building external corporate venturing capability
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rate venturing capabilities, the data of this study suggest that the capabilities and structures a
firm possesses and builds up early may co-determine the subsequent evolution of the external
corporate venturing capability. In ROLLER, for instance, its strong mergers and acquisition
and partnering capability has influenced the organization to concentrate on external corporate
venturing and further strengthening of the capability. In GIANT, external corporate venturing
cannot draw on such component capabilities, but rather must be built up from the scratch. In
some of the cases, current venturing activity has its roots in long standing venturing efforts.
For instance, INVENTOR has already conducted such efforts for several years, but trans-
formed from a large scale, more centralized operation to a more decentralized approach that
seeks to imitate venture capital operations in its principles. In contrast, SPEED with strong
capabilities in internal venturing has focused more on building up internal venturing capa-
bilities and less on external corporate venturing capability building.
Aside from the capabilities in different external corporate venturing modes, additional
initial resource endowments may influence the learning processes and ultimately external
corporate venturing capability. SPEED, for instance, has been able to establish its own corpo-
rate venture capital fund based on its strong brand. In contrast, GIANT perceived entry via a
partnership more promising due to the significantly weaker brand. One venturing manager
points out:
The objective of course within five or ten years is that we don't have to pay these
VC funds anymore, we can do it ourselves. The idea is that why SPEED isn't invest-
ing in VC funds? Because it doesn't have to while it has the name. It has the deal
flow. [We] don’t have that currently, so we have to invest into these VC funds.
In general terms, one can argue that in most corporations, it is possible to identify a
dominant mode of external corporate venturing and that corporations gravitate around such
venturing modes. This dominant venturing mode may have its origin in political or structuralBuilding external corporate venturing capability
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conditions within the organization or it may equally result from a particularly strong capabil-
ity in an external corporate venturing mode.
**********************************
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
**********************************
The learning processes described in the previous section allow for considerable variation
in the learning outcome. While some organizations are able to learn effectively from experi-
ence, other organizations exhibit difficulties in the same process. Furthermore, knowledge
creation, that is learning, should not be equated with capability creation. Rather, the knowl-
edge needs to be utilized to contribute to the external corporate venturing capability of the
firm. Table 7 summarizes evidence regarding knowledge management practices that firms
use in their capability development. Practices, such as ex-post case analysis and cross case
analysis, knowledge codification in processes and knowledge bases, active knowledge trans-
fer through personnel transfer, informal and formal communication, and information technol-
ogy systems supporting knowledge sharing, all influence the degree to which the organization
is able to effectively build an external venturing capability through the learning processes de-
scribed above.
**********************************
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
**********************************
ROCK may serve as an example how these practices are used to enhance learning. ROCK
conducts regular reviews of external ventures. These ventures are compared and factors in-
fluencing differences in performance are analyzed. Certain results of these analyses have
been codified in processes and policies. For instance, one of ROCK’s venture capital daugh-Building external corporate venturing capability
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ters requires the business, which unit it is connected to, to form a relationship with ventures,
in which the venture capital daughter plans to invest. At the same time several fora of formal
and informal communication have been set up. As personnel is often transferred from busi-
ness units, a strong network of contacts exists that can be leveraged for this communication.
Finally, ROCK has focused efforts to build up Intranet solutions to support these venturing
activities.
The quality of learning from experience is critically dependent on the amount of effort
spent on analyzing the cases and capturing the lessons learned. Interviewees pointed out that
the single cases and the comparison of multiple cases provided valuable lessons to be adopted
in future cases. Often such cases have been used to define processes and policies for future
cases. The challenge in ex-post analysis of cases comes from the time required to perform
this analysis. Several interviewees point to the immense pressure in the cases and the lack of
resources for analyzing and reflecting on cases. In some cases academic collaboration has
been employed, that is, case analysis has been outsourced.
While case analysis may create knowledge in the person analyzing the case, this knowl-
edge is not necessarily readily available to others. Often learning results in tacit knowledge
(Polanyi, 1966) that is difficult to teach to others. Knowledge codification is recognized in
previous studies (Kale and Singh, 1998, Singh and Zollo, 1998) to support learning from
experience particularly in situations in which the number of cases is limited. Evidence from
this study suggests that the firms use codification in processes and in the form of lessons
learned to maximize learning from experiences.
While case analysis and knowledge codification support the knowledge creation, active
knowledge transfer supports the utilization of the knowledge. Utilizing knowledge is an im-
portant element in the development of the external corporate venturing capability (Zander,Building external corporate venturing capability
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1991) and in the development of capabilities on the venture level. Firms utilize several
mechanisms for internal knowledge transfer. The evidence suggests that personnel transfer is
one important mechanism for knowledge transfer both within external corporate venturing
units and to business units. Transferring personnel to business units may be an effective way,
to increase communication between business units and a central venturing unit, as one ven-
turing manager suggests:
[Our external corporate venturing people] have been isolated but it is changing.
We are moving people to the business units that have that competence. [Our external
corporate venturing people] come in late into the game. If the capability is in the
business you should get better results because they are already involved in the strat-
egy phase.
Transferring experienced managers may serve as a more efficient method of transferring
knowledge than teaching this knowledge in a teacher-pupil relationship. Often, the receiving
party lacks the absorptive capacity to effectively transfer knowledge across organizational
units (Szulanski, 1996).
In addition, formal and informal communication can support knowledge transfer. The
challenge in the venturing environment is to create communication structures that allow for
knowledge exchange without creating information overload. In this context, the case firms
relies on a mixture of formal events and a close network of contacts among the managers in-
volved in external corporate venturing. While the formal events provide a regular basis for
the exchange of information, the risk exists that too frequent exchange is resource intensive
without creating much additional knowledge. A tight network of social contacts among ven-
turing managers and relevant managers in the business units supports informal communica-
tion knowledge exchange. By the same token, a lack of such contacts, as has been found in
the case of GIANT, hampers knowledge exchange and communication.Building external corporate venturing capability
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This finding accords with arguments put forward by Hansen (1999). In a study of 120
new product development projects, Hansen shows that weak ties support the identification of
relevant knowledge in other business units. However, the transfer of this knowledge particu-
larly in cases of complex knowledge, requires the stronger ties that are more easily provided
through a formal setting. This suggests that a combination of both weak and strong ties may
be necessary to ensure effective knowledge transfer.
Finally, information and communication technology is a valuable tool for knowledge and
information exchange in large, global firms. Corporate Intranet solutions in particular can be
used to maintain knowledge databases and function as an idea exchange.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, I set out to investigate how firms develop new capabilities to adapt to envi-
ronmental change and turbulence. Employing a multiple case study design and focusing on
the capability of new business creation and development through corporate venture capital,
alliances, and acquisitions, I have investigated the learning processes that lead to the devel-
opment of an external corporate venturing capability and factors that affect these learning
processes. The questions that this study addresses are of fundamental importance in times
when fast paced change seems to be a key challenge in most industries.
The results from this study suggest that capability building takes place through two broad
groups of learning processes that complement each other. On the one hand, organizations ac-
quire knowledge about bout how to manage external corporate ventures outside of actual
venture they engage in. This knowledge builds the basis for capability formation. However,
often this knowledge is not well adapted to the specific organizational context that is it is not
firm specific in nature. Only through the second complementary learning process, learning-
by-doing, knowledge is adapted to the specific context and an in-depth capability is built.Building external corporate venturing capability
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The study has further analyzed two factors that affect the above learning processes. In line
with evolutionary theory, I found that initial conditions such as resource endowments or ex-
isting capabilities related to the capability to be built affect the development path of a capa-
bility. Often, organizations gravitate towards specific venturing modes due to these path de-
pendencies. The role of initial conditions points towards the limits of managerial intentional-
ity. While learning processes enable organizations to build new capabilities and thus adapt to
the demands of a changing environment, inertial forces act as a counter force effectively lim-
iting the pace of development if not the development of capabilities at large.
Initial conditions define a trajectory for the learning path. Knowledge management prac-
tices influence the pace and direction the learning processes take within this trajectory. De-
pending on the resources involved and on knowledge codification and knowledge transfer
approaches taken, the depth of capability building varies across organizations. The results
from this study suggest that effective knowledge management practices, such as codification
or the use of informal knowledge transfer channels, play an important role to overcome the
limitations imposed by initial conditions.
The conclusions presented in this paper are limited in scope and method. My study has
been focussing on the development of the external corporate venturing capability.  Corporate
venturing seemed an ideal ground for this study because of its recent nature in at least the in-
dustries studied. While most of my findings should apply for other capabilities, rigorous em-
pirical research is called for to test the findings of this study in other contexts. I have further
limited my analysis to information and communication technology sectors, not because I be-
lieve that capability building is relevant only in these sectors, but because the rapid and often
dramatic changes in these sectors make new capability building particularly salient there.
This paper does not attempt testing the model I develop in the statistical sense. Future re-
search should extend this study by developing and testing quantitative models of the learningBuilding external corporate venturing capability
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processes and factors affecting them. However, the findings of the study clearly indicate that
more fine-grained research of learning processes would help to inform the literature of capa-
bility building and increase our understanding.
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TABLE 1
Evidence regarding learning-by-doing processes
Organization Evidence
GIANT This was our first case and our strategy or tactics has been learning by doing.  What are the expectations of the collaboration? That has been very
interesting to know and realize and understand, what are the expectations of both parties. And next case we are much more ready when we are at the
negotiation table to understand their expectations and to know our expectations and communicate these to them.
Well, we are creating the processes at the same time when we are now doing the Investments. It's basically learning by doing in a way. The most effi-
cient way is to do it at the same time when you make the actual cases.
SPEED Of course these cases that were mentioned that have been before this process, what we discussed in this and what might be in those cases is not the
same. Actually, this process was made with those cases in mind. The procedure they had gone through was somehow considered here, and this is some
kind abstraction from the real world but I think they have to some extent gone through this kind of process.
I would say that during the few acquisitions we have done, we have learned quite a bit. The first ones were not as successful as the ones that were done
lately. I would say that they were done differently... So, we started with very ad hoc methods. It was learning process. Now we have learned to say that
the integration phase is very crucial. We need to dedicate resources, we need to have human resources there, we need to have the integration man-
aged, we need to have the business owner, the technology owner, HR, legal, IM, all that.
We have some action in the pipe, in all levels some cases, the focus has been to create material here, not to scale this up… The focus will clearly be for
quite some time on creating new material here. In a more quality way.
RECEIVER It is a learning process for us. The venturing arrangements you use depend on experiences, on know how and knowledge of decision-makers. The
learning process is running. We are learning how to use Joint Ventures for new business development. We do a lot of trial and error.
It is one of our tasks to work closer with the venture daughter. We need to link closer to be able to transfer content from the investments. Up to now it
has been more of a coincidence. It went via personal relationships. Now we try to institutionalize it.
ROLLER Transfer of internal learning has been important in our strategy. Internal competence development in the [home] market and then transfer rather than
going to the most developed market and then trying to transfer to the [home] market. We learned telecom in a niche.
ROCK We have built up a lot of experience from the cases we have run. We have tried to capture this internally and transfer it to other units. A lot was
through personnel transfer.
INVENTOR Running actual ventures together with a VC has helped us to learn the VC Process. We have captured this learning by making lessons learned explicit
and transferring then into the way we look for instance at internal ventures.
FLYER For each venture, we write the specific. How it went. What we learned. What was good and what was bad. So you can go back and see the 10 ventures.
How did it go and who was involved. Then you can actually go and talk to those people, looking for specific type of experience.Building external corporate venturing capability
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TABLE 2
Evidence regarding learning-before-doing processes
Organization Evidence
GIANT Why we work with a VC fund? But in the longer term, it's kind of learning, this VC operation. The objective is of course that within 5 or 10 years we
don't have to pay these VC funds anymore. We can do it ourselves.
This kind of operation also creates the necessary competencies for partnering with companies and acquisitions and this type of growth is used that
both acquisitions will most probably be one of the tools for the high growth when it comes in this business area.
But investments through the venture capital funds are just one part of the game. We are now developing own direct investment processes and method-
ologies.
SPEED The guys we have involved in this fund at the moment, first of all they have some kind of a transactional background to some degree, we have done
several mergers and acquisitions, all of us, we’ve been involved. And there’s a due diligence process there, and this due diligence process is I would
say similar but lighter.
You have to understand that these people who we have in the fund have several start-up companies, as a background for us collectively.  One of us has
been working in a VC fund earlier, so even if I’m saying that we have started not so long ago and we are still learning, it’s still true, we had some ex-
perience when we started.
RECEIVER We are hiring people with the right experiences.
ROLLER We might want to have our own VC fund as well in the future but we didn’t have the know-how. That is why we first went to a fund and sent somebody
there. Later [venture capital manager] might have an own fund. It’s knowledge creation and learning.
ROCK If you have been buying companies outside, moving into VC, it’s rather an easy task, a small step. So that’s why some of the people here have an M&A
background.
We have been working with those consultants from [name]. They did this high profile project that kicked off a lot of our venturing activities.
Investments in VC funds are also a learning tool. Learning takes place through regular meetings, participation in formal annual meetings, and trans-
fer of people to train those as Venture Capitalists and support due diligence. It is kind of a trainee program for our corporate venture capital people.
INVENTOR We learned by watching how the VCs do it. The Business plan is not the final product. You need to change strategy as the environment evolves.
FLYER We had a lot of consultants coming in and give presentations. A lot of concepts that we have been using later.
We are moving a lot of people with venturing skills to the business units. That’s where the action is.Building external corporate venturing capability
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TABLE 3
Evidence regarding initial conditions
Organization Evidence
GIANT People in our divisions had very little knowledge at the beginning.
The whole Due Diligence or Venture Capital process is something from which a corporation can learn a lot… [There are activities that]
are totally new things in a company like [our corporation], because of our background.
It is kind of a cultural thing in an organization, for example when I talked to our top management, they're always talking about technol-
ogy hovering, and let's not put any money, let's just suck everything possible from the small company away. It's a large attitude change. I
don't know how do you transform
SPEED One of the things to remember is that we are starting this thing so most of the things we do not have placed yet. That does not mean that
we would not recognize the importance to have some arrangements for that, and at the moment it is very much from hand to mouth ad
hoc approaches that we are forced to use until we get this thing more established.
You have to understand that these people whom we have in the fund have several start-up companies as a background for us collectively.
One of us has been working in a VC fund earlier, so even if I’m saying that we have started not so long ago and we are still learning, it’s
still true, we had some experience when we started.
RECEIVER Reason of favoring non-equity is a historical preference. But there are activities to change these preferences. It is a learning process for
us. Modes used depend on experiences, on know how and on knowledge of decision-makers. The learning process is running. We have
difficulties due to our history. We were rather self-sufficient.
ROLLER Partnering is a longstanding competence of [our corporation]. We have no explicit competence center. It happens through personnel
transfer. M&A is in contrast a traditional business area of [our corporation].
We are more external oriented in our approach. It is kind of our modus operandi. It is built into our approach.
ROCK [Our corporation] is able to work in the venture capital community because it has a long history of fund investments and other banking
relationships Our managing director has extensive contacts also in the VC scene and uses these networks strategically. This is important
because VC is a closed community.
Funny enough, most of the people in the group do have an M&A background; somehow it helps…That has been more or less an explicit
choice.Building external corporate venturing capability
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INVENTOR That’s right, at the time (1994) we had what we commonly referred to inside here as the Big Bang approach. You took hundred-person
design teams, and you took sometimes hundreds of millions of dollars, and invested it over multiple years, hoping that it would hit a
homerun, the system that you were investing in. Then change the CEO and we had some experience with failing some of those projects,
FLYER It is very easy to establish technology development relationships. We deal with them all the time. We have standard methods in NDA and
that kind of thing. But its not so much about these. We have all the necessary legal and corporate support. Even if every deal is unique,
we have lots of experience, lots of people who are available to us. It’s a competence we have.
We are a really decentralize company. All action is in the business units. Our corporate development has been isolated but it is chang-
ing.Building external corporate venturing capability
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TABLE 4
Evidence regarding knowledge management practices
Organization Evidence
GIANT We have all these experiences from the [name] case. And how could we learn from it? This is also the case in these VC operations. I
would say it has increased the capabilities tremendously. How to share this knowledge. These are issues we are struggling with, espe-
cially in an organization structure where there are very independent business divisions. How to get the knowledge absorbed in the or-
ganization.
How do we learn from these bad cases, putting the cat on the table: "Why are we in this company as an owner, what are we doing for
benefiting from it. Are we doing the right things, what could we do, what alternatives we have?" Things like this. I feel these are the most
important issues.
That's a good approach. We've been trying to define these learning cases. Ok, this is a case we missed, and even that is a new kind ap-
proach here. You can see a year afterwards that this is a case we should've entered, start to do something. We had the opportunity, the
time window, but we were incapable of doing the decision.
So, basically what you are trying is you're trying to transfer the know-how via people going there, learning the thing for a while, and
then basically teaching people here in [our corporation] doing the same things internally.
Well, we are creating the processes at the same time when we are now doing the Investments. It's basically learning by doing in a way.
The most efficient way is to do it at the same time when you make the actual cases.
[Name] has also the venture capital background from the financial point of view and has quite a lot of experience on that, so basically at
this stage [learning] comes basically from the interactive discussions relating to the case.
Comparing cases becomes important, when we have a few investments done and have the experience.Building external corporate venturing capability
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SPEED I believe there is informal communication, kind of networking, networking one person talks to the other person. But I think that funda-
mentally --- in organization that is growing as fast as [we are]. And organization is fundamentally going to consider themselves global;
one can not rely on informal conversation, the shared information only.
There are actually software tools and methodologies that can be employed in an organization to do collection and evaluation of infor-
mation about alliances. But employing these is a fundamental cultural shift.
Actually, the first step is to get more brainpower. We are very few here in the overhead, we have to have, more slack, in the overhead to
have some time to reflect. Think and review at times...
To summarize, this learning doesn’t take place so that we create great PowerPoint binders, and then distribute them saying: ”Hey, this
is the great wisdom!” It’s more like day-to-day, hands-on, and subtler from that point of view.
I think one of the difficulties in big companies like [our corporation] is that things are done many times. You don’t have to invent a wheel
always, you can go and ask how somebody else did it. And that is always a difficulty to know what has happened somewhere else, to
know that there is someone that you could go and ask. And I think that if people get this... that they know that somebody else having done
this before so they are willing to go and ask and take what they have and use it.
RECEIVER We have a good intranet for that. We have internal conferences of the new business units. We have communication fora. We work to-
gether project oriented. There is the trade-off between communication and cost. How much should be communicated. We try to avoid
over-bureaucratization. We are trying to network. We meet in different places and at different events. For instance, our venture daughter
does regular events where they present their portfolio companies. There you meet not only the ventures but also the other new business
people. Quite a number of communication possibilities. But we do not formalize such as once per month a new business day.
ROLLER [Knowledge transfer] happens through personnel transfer.
We achieved knowledge transfer through the board. We have in [venture] the key management positions.
ROCK We have a network of people over the cooperation. We exchange information in formal and informal discussion. We try not to over-
coordinate. Of course, we have regular and informal meetings, ad hoc meetings.  Most of that is daily conversation on the phone.
We have the knowledge management group. Their task is to organize and spread this know-how.
We share a lot of information via our intranet. We have set up systems so that we can share information and develop our knowledge
base.Building external corporate venturing capability
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INVENTOR We learn from the ventures with the help of the manage liaison function. For each investment we have a middle manager acting as a liai-
son. He talks periodically with the venture and explores how they are going where we could collaborate where we could help.
FLYER We do have the internal corporate development function. We do write down processes and methodology. All stuff would be documented
and be available for all the people in the group. A new guy comes here and is hooked with a more senior guy on his first project, and
everyone is developing their own specialty.
We try to put different teams together and try to put the ideas together. We might need some software that could help that. We really have
difficulties to bring people together. We haven’t emphasized cross cases analysis to identify the learning how you could speed up the
process. We really should emphasize that more We need critical mass to be able to learn faster and having resources to analyze.
One thing that FLYER is particularly good at, is a call across the company, you call some across the company and pass something on,
without a lot of hierarchy and structure, proving something.
We have a web site that where we put up guidelines on processes…We’ve talked about software tracking tools for capturing ideas.